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When I launched the Judicial Review consultation earlier this year, I wanted to spark a debate 
about the purpose of Judicial Review, its evolution and the reforms that might be needed. The 
Independent Review of Administrative Law (IRAL) is the foundation for that debate. The IRAL Panel 
produced an excellent report and I was persuaded by their recommendations, but it seemed to me, 
having considered the discussion in the report and the submissions to the IRAL call for evidence, 
that there was a case for going further. I decided to consult on other options. 
As was the case with the IRAL call for evidence last autumn, our consultation in March and April 
elicited a wide range of detailed and thoughtful responses. I said in the consultation document 
that I wanted the process of Judicial Review reform to be iterative. Analysis of the consultation 
responses has provided us with a solid basis on which to proceed with a number of reforms, on 
which we will now legislate, but the Government will continue to think about the way Judicial 
Review is operating in the round and whether further changes, including the procedural measures 
on which we consulted, may be needed. 
Whilst those who responded to the consultation had a multitude of perspectives on the purpose 
and place of Judicial Review, a common theme has been that Judicial Review should work hand in 
hand with the executive and with Parliament in ensuring good public administration. 
Within the idea of good administration are several principles. Sometimes, and indeed usually, they 
are complementary, but at other times they may be in conflict. This is especially so in a court’s 
determination about granting relief. A court needs to not only take into account the rights of the 
claimant, but also the consequences of granting a remedy, the effects on the rights of others, and 
the nature and extent of the error to give but a few examples.
I have said that I want to restore the place of justice at the heart of our society by ensuring that 
all the institutions of state can act together in their appropriate capacity to uphold the rule of law. 
The reforms to Judicial Review set out in this document will contribute to this by increasing the 
flexibility of the remedies available to the courts, empowering judges to provide relief in a way 
which is balanced and attuned to the circumstances of the case. In this way we can strengthen 
Judicial Review as a means of attaining good, just, public administration.
Giving the courts the option to suspend, remove or limit the retrospective effect of relief, represents 
a major increase in remedial flexibility. And whilst the discretion of the court is important, and 
ultimately will always remain, a presumption to give a form of relief which allows the defendant an 
opportunity to make good an error – where that affords adequate redress – is appropriate. It will 
ensure Judicial Review is directed at practical solutions.
Another element of these reforms is more structural, namely removing ‘Cart’ Judicial Reviews. The 
IRAL Panel recommended this reform but were criticised by stakeholders who argued that the 
Panel’s evidential basis for the recommendation was flawed. In light of further analysis of the data 
(explained in the present document) I am satisfied that the Panel reached the right conclusion. 
The sheer number of challenges per year, the very low success rate, and the stature of the Upper 
Tribunal mean that Cart Judicial Reviews are detrimental to the efficiency and function of the 
justice system.
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The Government is introducing legislation on these measures in the Judicial Review and Courts Bill 





1. Judicial Review is the process by which a court reviews the lawfulness of a decision or action 
made by a public body, specifically looking at how the decision was made, rather than the 
rights and wrongs of the conclusion reached. 
2. The Government’s 2019 Manifesto included a commitment to look afresh at Judicial Review. 
In July 2020, an expert Panel chaired by Lord Faulks QC was established to conduct the 
Independent Review of Administrative Law (IRAL). 
3. The Panel’s task was to consider how the legitimate interest of the citizen in being able to 
challenge the lawfulness of executive action through the courts can be properly balanced with 
the role of the executive to govern effectively under the law. 
4. Having conducted a call for evidence from 7 September to 26 October 2020, which elicited 
well over 200 submissions, Lord Faulks and his colleagues delivered their report to the Lord 
Chancellor in January 2021. 
5. In their report, the IRAL Panel charted developments in Judicial Review over the past half-
century. The Panel wrote at length about the diminishing field of non-justiciable areas1, 
highlighted the courts’ inconsistent approach regarding nullity and reflected on concerns 
expressed by others around ideas such as the ‘principle of legality’2. The Panel also pointed 
out several instances where the courts have not had remedies at their disposal that provide 
the flexibility they need, and that this hampers the effectiveness of the courts in dealing with 
Judicial Review cases. The Panel concluded that, in the main, Judicial Review is not in need 
of systemic reform3, and the answer to any judicial overreach is judicial restraint, something 
which does not require legislation.4 
6. The Panel recommended two reforms to substantive law – reversing the Cart judgment and 
introducing suspended quashing orders as an additional remedy – and proposed changes to 
procedure to be considered and taken forward by the Civil Procedure Rule Committee (CPRC).5
7. The Government published the Panel’s report on 18 March 2021. On the same day it also 
published its response in the form of a consultation document, ‘Judicial Review Reform - the 
Government Response to the Independent Review of Administrative Law’. The consultation 
document indicated that Ministers were minded to take forward the Panel’s recommendations. 
It also, drawing on the IRAL Panel’s analysis and submissions to the IRAL call for evidence, 
sought views on a number of other proposals: 
1 IRAL Report, 2.11-36, 2.94-95
2 IRAL Report, 3.29
3 IRAL Report, 2.96, pp.129-130
4 IRAL Report, 3.19-3.22) These are views with which the Government agrees
5 Changes include:  removing the requirement for a claim to be issued “promptly”, but retaining the 3-month time limit 
providing further guidance on intervenors  
providing for an extra step in the procedure of a Reply, to be filed within seven days of receipt of the Acknowledgement of 
Service.
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• legislating to clarify the effect of statutory ouster clauses
• legislating to introduce a discretion to make remedies prospective only
• legislating, in relation to Statutory Instruments, for a presumption, or a 
requirement for any remedy to be prospective only
• legislating for quashing orders to be presumed or required to be suspended
• legislating to clarify the principles and concept of nullity
• making further procedural reforms (to be considered by the CPRC).
8. The consultation period ran for six weeks, closing on 29 April 2021. During this time, significant 
stakeholder engagement was undertaken, details of which can be found at Annex D.
9. The Government faced criticism for the length of the consultation period, which ran during 
the Easter period and over the pre-election period for the Scottish and Welsh elections. It was 
a shorter consultation than in some other cases but in light of the work of the IRAL Panel, the 
submissions to its call for evidence, and the engagement with stakeholders carried out by the 
Ministry of Justice during the consultation, the Lord Chancellor considers that the consultation 
period was sufficient. 
10. The consultation elicited a wealth of helpful responses. Whilst most respondents were broadly 
opposed to the proposals, many provided argument and information that was invaluable in the 
process of policy development that followed the end of the consultation.
11. Proposals to legislate for a general framework to clarify the effect of ouster clauses, and to 
legislate for a broad framework on the principles which lead to a decision being a nullity, will 
not be progressed. However, proposals on remedies will deal with the potential effects of 
nullity. The Government will proceed with removing Cart Judicial Reviews and with providing 
additional remedial powers to suspend, remove or limit the retrospective effect of quashing 
orders, which will be guided by a list of factors and can be made subject to any conditions.
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12. The Judicial Review measures in the Judicial Review and Courts Bill are:
(1) Removing Cart Judicial Reviews, by which certain decisions of the Upper Tribunal are 
reviewable by the supervisory courts. The Supreme Court’s decision in Cart6 has given rise 
to numerous cases challenging Upper Tribunal decisions of which very few are successful, 
showing that the tribunal system is effective and offers protection consistent with the rule 
of law. While recognising that access to justice is important, the Government considers 
this to be disproportionately resource intensive. This legislation excludes the ability to 
judicially review the decision of the Upper Tribunal to refuse permission to appeal from 
the First-tier Tribunal, but leaving a residual review jurisdiction for the supervisory courts in 
certain circumstances, to ensure the structure of the courts system is consistent with the 
rule of law. 
(2) Providing for the court to suspend quashing orders as a remedy in Judicial 
Review cases. Like overturning Cart, this was one of the IRAL Panel’s substantive 
recommendations. This proposal will allow the court to suspend, for a specified time, the 
effect of an order quashing a decision or action. This gives the public authority time to take 
action, such as making transitional arrangements, in anticipation of the quashing order 
coming into effect. This legislation gives a discretion to suspend quashing orders, with this 
discretion being guided by a non-exhaustive list of factors. 
(3) Providing for the court to limit the retrospective effect of quashing orders as a 
remedy in Judicial Review cases (where a court would make the effect of a quashing 
order prospective rather than retrospective). The exercise of this power would be guided by 
a non-exhaustive list of factors. Whilst not recommended by the IRAL Panel, we see merit 
in giving judges discretionary use of this remedy so that, in certain situations, the adverse 
effects of retrospective quashing may be avoided. 
(4) Outline the list of factors that will guide the court’s discretion and create a 
presumption that the court should use the powers outlined above where they would 
offer adequate redress to the claimant. Presumptions were not recommended by the 
IRAL Panel and generally met with scepticism from respondents to the consultation. 
However, the Government believes that this presumption alongside the factors for the 
court to consider will guide a quicker development of consistent principles governing the 
use of these new remedial powers.
6 R (on the application of Cart) v The Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28
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(5) Making clear on the face of the Bill that the legal concept of nullity does not prevent 
or fetter the court’s remedial discretion. This ensures that the concept of nullity or 
effects of invalidity could not be used to undermine the courts’ discretion to use these 
remedial powers.
13. The present document summarises the responses to the consultation in so far as they relate to 
substantive (not procedural) law reform and sets out the measures which the Government is 
taking forward in the Judicial Review and Courts Bill. The procedural reforms are not a relevant 
consideration for the Bill as they are a matter for the independent CPRC. Responses to these 
questions will be considered and responded to at a later date. 
14. The consultation document included a high-level assessment of the economic and equality 
impacts of the policy proposals with a commitment to develop a full Impact Assessment and 
Equality Statement alongside the consultation response. These are being published at the same 
time as this response document. 
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Wider Judicial Review Considerations
15. Section 2 of the consultation document, which set out the Government’s thinking as to the 
real and perceived developments of the law in relation to Judicial Review over recent years, did 
not contain any proposals for change. For this reason, the present document does not propose 
any measures in relation to the matters discussed in that Section. However, many respondents 
had views on its contents and we therefore set out the Government’s further reflections here. 
16. Respondents argued that, at most, there are a handful of court decisions that were arguably 
incorrect and that, therefore, there isn’t a wider problem to address. This reasoning is 
predicated on the view that a problem is not a problem unless it happens often. The 
Government is not persuaded by that argument, since even a single case can have wide 
ramifications. 
17. The purpose of Judicial Review, in statutory contexts, is to ensure that those who Parliament 
entrusts with public powers do not exceed or misuse those powers. And so the role of 
the courts in Judicial Review is to be the servant of Parliament. The standard grounds of 
Judicial Review, which review the exercise of powers granted by Parliament, are best seen as 
interpretative presumptions. So, when Parliament grants a power it is presumed to intend that 
the power is to be exercised in good faith, reasonably, for the purposes for which it is granted, 
taking into account all relevant considerations and ignoring all irrelevant considerations. While 
these principles and their current application are largely uncontentious, there are emerging 
grounds of Judicial Review which give some cause for concern. The Government is concerned 
about the possible direction of travel in three areas, as discussed below.
18. The first is the possibility of the misuse of Wednesbury7, due to the potential8 difficulty in 
finding an objective way to measure it, and the varying levels of intensity it is said to have. On 
the latter point Lord Justice Haddon-Cave’s recent Gresham lecture is instructive: 
“the constant refinement and Enigma variations on Wednesbury and the spawning of a 
myriad of different public law tests in an attempt to achieve ‘perfection’ in every scenario 
has led to a great deal of obscurity and entanglement. Bright lines are no bad thing in the 
good administration of justice and good government. Not everything can be nuanced. In the 
slightly Alice-in-wonderland world of close or anxious or intense or quite intense scrutiny in 
public law, you will forgive me for asking: Is today Wednesbury or Thursbury and Fribury?”9 
19. The theoretical malleability of ‘unreasonableness’ and its arguable closeness to value 
judgements means it could be subject to conceptual overreach, or used to provide a basis for 
other substantive grounds of Judicial Review.
20. Second, and related to that, are the calls for proportionality (i.e. the idea that the court does 
not just look at whether the decision maker has properly used the powers given to it by 
7  Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223
8   See Lord Carnwath’s discussion in https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131112-lord-carnwath.pdf the ALBA Annual Lecture 2013 
(supremecourt.uk) page 18. See also https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/11/20/mark-elliott-where-next-for-the-wednesbury-principle-
a-brief-response-to-lord-carnwath/ Mark Elliott: Where next for the Wednesbury principle? A brief response to Lord Carnwath – UK 
Constitutional Law Association (UK Constitutional Law Association Blog https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/11/20/mark-elliott-where-next-
for-the-wednesbury-principle-a-brief-response-to-lord-carnwath/).
9 Complexity and the Law, Gresham Lecture, page 10: https://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/law-complexity
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Parliament but also whether the decision or action is a proportionate way of achieving a policy 
aim) to become a general ground of Judicial Review. This would fundamentally change the role 
of the courts and risk a kind of adjudication which draws the judiciary into political or value-
laden questions. The courts have in fact pointed out such dangers themselves. For example, 
Lord Neuberger in Keyu v FCO summed up the risk adroitly:
“The move from rationality to proportionality, as urged by the appellants, would appear 
to have potentially profound and far-reaching consequences, because it would involve the 
court considering the merits of the decision at issue: in particular, it would require the courts 
to consider the balance which the decision-maker has struck between competing interests 
(often a public interest against a private interest) and the weight to be accorded to each 
such interest”10
21. In the absence of explicit Parliamentary authorisation (as was provided in the Human Rights 
Act) proportionality should not be seen or become a standard ground of review. 
22. The third concern is around the principle of legality. The IRAL Report discussed11 one element 
of this – the lack of certainty about the triggers for the principle of legality. Another element 
is the concern Professor Varuhas has raised about what he terms the “augmented” and 
“proactive” variants of this principle which “make significant inroads into executive discretion, 
and Parliament’s capacity to reshape the common law, even where it manifests its intent by 
clear words.”12 
23. The Government believes none of these three areas are at a stage where legislative 
intervention is required to maintain the proper balance between the Executive, Parliament, 
and the Judiciary. The Government agrees with the IRAL Panel that, “solutions to any potential 
problems of judicial overreach and uncertainty created by the current state of the law on the 
grounds of Judicial Review must come from the courts, and the courts should be encouraged 
to do what they can to address these problems.13” 
10  Keyu v Sectetary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2015] UKSC 69 [133]
11  IRAL at 3.31-34
12  Varuhas, ‘Principle of Legality’, The Cambridge Law Journal, (December 2020) 




24. There were 141 responses to the consultation. A list of respondents is at Annex A.
25. Responses to the consultation are considered by proposal rather than by question, as several 
questions addressed the same theme and many responses addressed the consultation 
thematically rather than by question. The proposals are:
• Cart Judicial Reviews 
• Ouster Clauses
• Remedies:
• Suspended quashing orders




Quantitative Breakdown of Responses
Type of Response Count % Total
Online Portal 58 41
By Email 83 59
Total 141 100
Fig. 1
Author Count % Total
Law Firm (a registered law firm) 21 15
LAWYER (AN INDIVIDUAL LAWYER, RESPONDING IN A 
PERSONAL CAPACITY)
5 4
PARLIAMENTARIAN (A MEMBER OF EITHER HOUSE OR 
A PARLIAMENTARY GROUP)
2 1
PRIVATE CITIZEN (AN INDIVIDUAL RESPONDING IN A 
PERSONAL CAPACITY)
39 28




Author Count % Total
OTHER ORGANISATION (ANY ORGANISATION 
WHICH IS NOT A LAW FIRM, LEGAL ASSOCIATION OR 
ACADEMIC BODY)
31 22
LEGAL ASSOCIATION (A GROUP, ORGANISATION OR 



















LAW FIRM 18 18 20 19 17 8
LAWYER 5 3 4 4 4 0
PARLIAMENTARIAN 2 2 2 2 2 0
PRIVATE CITIZEN 30 30 29 31 32 1
ACADEMIC 11 15 12 13 11 3
OTHER 
ORGANISATION
19 24 25 26 19 14
LEGAL 
ASSOCIATION
20 22 22 23 19 8
Fig. 3
Qualitative Breakdown
26. Respondents were generally against removing Cart Judicial Reviews, which they saw as a 
valuable route of challenge, and they felt their argument was strengthened by the IRAL Panel’s 
data in relation to Cart Judicial Reviews having been called into question. Respondents were 
generally in favour of providing the courts with discretion for any of the proposed remedies, 
and widely against any requirement or presumption being imposed. Respondents voiced 
concerns relating to suspended and prospective remedies, as well as proposals relating to 
nullity. Many provided helpful examples or case studies across the span of the Government’s 
proposals. 
27. Of the Government’s proposals only one, the removal of Cart Judicial Reviews, applies to 
the Devolved Administrations. The Welsh and Scottish Governments did not support this 
reform and were critical both of the short length of the consultation period and the fact that 
it ran through their pre-election period. In response, the Government undertook additional 
engagement with the Welsh and Scottish Governments beyond the consultation period, 
through a combination of meetings and exchanges of letters.
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Cart Judicial Reviews
28. The IRAL Panel recommended that the Government should legislate to reverse the effect of the 
Supreme Court decision in Cart, thereby re-affirming that decisions of the Upper Tribunal to 
refuse permission to appeal are not subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. 
29. The Government agreed with the Panel and in Question 2 of the consultation document 
sought views on this reform and how best to implement it. Of the 105 respondents who 
answered this question, most were against overturning the Cart judgment. 
30. The majority of respondents felt the IRAL Panel had reached an erroneous conclusion on 
Cart because (they argued) the Panel had used inaccurate data as to the proportion of Cart 
cases that are successful. Respondents cited a variety of reasons as to why the methodology 
used by the Panel to analyse success rate was flawed. For example, it took no account of the 
presumption in CPR 54.7A(9)(b) that cases in which permission is granted are quashed. Many 
considered that the injustice that Cart Judicial Reviews prevent, in ensuring that errors can 
be corrected, is more important than any concerns about resource, particularly as any cases 
that succeed involve important points of law. In any case, they said, there is no evidence that 
Cart Judicial Reviews are a “significant cost”, indeed the streamlined procedure set out at CPR 
54.7A is designed to reduce the judicial resources required to deal with Cart Judicial Reviews 
compared to other non-Cart applications; the two cannot be compared like-for-like.
31. Other responses, particularly from claimant groups and non-government organisations, argued 
that Cart Judicial Reviews should not be removed in any circumstances as they are needed in 
order to maximise protection of individual rights. Respondents pointed out that overturning 
Cart would primarily affect immigration and asylum cases and argued that the potential 
human rights consequences might be severe under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) and the Refugee Convention. These respondents felt that if Cart were reversed another 
‘safety valve’ should be provided, such as a statutory right of appeal to the Court of Appeal, to 
ensure that errors can be corrected.
32. Alternative mechanisms suggested by respondents included the Upper Tribunal reviewing its 
own refusal to grant permission to appeal from the First-tier Tribunal14, and amendments to 
procedures to make Cart Judicial Review more efficient and effective.
33. By contrast, some submissions – mostly from academics – favoured reform, as they argued 
that regardless of the evidence base, the Upper Tribunal affords sufficient oversight as 
an independent body with specialist expertise and equivalent status to the High Court. 
Other respondents argued that justice does not require endless opportunities for judicial 
consideration of a claimant’s case.
34. Some respondents highlighted that the proposal would have implications for the devolved 
nations and raised issues of bifurcation of the Judicial Review jurisdictions in the United 
Kingdom (UK). For this reason, it was felt that the proposal should be limited to England and 
Wales due to differences between the Judicial Review process in England and Wales and the 
process in Scotland (which has additional safeguards), and because there is no evidence of a 
high volume of applications and low proportion of successful outcomes in Scotland. 
14  There is presently such a power in section 10 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
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Government Response
35. In light of criticism of the IRAL Report’s finding that only 0.22% of Cart Judicial Reviews are 
successful, the Ministry of Justice undertook a fresh analysis of the data. This work is set out 
in full in the Impact Assessment which is available online (but is also set out in Annex E of this 
document) and concludes that the success rate is around 3%. The IRAL Panel were therefore 
right to conclude that the success rate in Cart cases is substantially lower than the success 
rate15 in other types of Judicial Review, where the data indicate a range of 40% to 50%16. 
36. Given the high number of Cart Judicial Review claims (around 750 a year from 2016-2019), 
the very low success rate, and that the Upper Tribunal is a Superior Court of Record (which 
means it can set precedents and enforce its decisions) presided over by senior judges, which 
sits as the apex of a wider system of checks and balances for certain administrative decisions, 
the Government’s conclusion is that Cart Judicial Reviews are a disproportionate use of 
valuable judicial resource. 
37. To improve the efficiency of the courts and reaffirm the position of the Upper Tribunal, the 
Government has decided to legislate to overturn the Cart judgment. Given that the objective 
of the change is to remove the disproportionate and unjustified burden from the system, the 
Government does not intend to create an alternative route of challenge as this could simply 
shift the impact on resources to another part of the justice system. 
38. A full devolution analysis has been conducted to understand the impact of this proposal in 
the devolved nations. In light of the available evidence base, this measure will apply UK-wide, 
insofar as they relate to reserved matters.
39. The Government conducted a Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) analysis to understand the 
discriminatory impact this proposal would have in relation to protected characteristics under 
the Equality Act 2010, taking into account the consultation responses. While the assessment 
acknowledges the risk of indirect discrimination arising from removing the Cart Judicial Review 
route – because of the high proportion of cases in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber that 
will be affected by the reform and the race, religion or belief of the claimants in such cases 
– it concludes that the policy is proportionate because of the resource implications associated 
with administering such cases and the very low success rate in comparison to other types of 
Judicial Review. The full assessment is available online. 
40. The means by which this measure will be implemented will be covered in the Ouster Clauses 
section that follows. 
15  Here, we define a “successful” case as one where an application for a Cart Judicial Reviews has resulted in the original permission to appeal 
refusal being quashed (either because permission to appeal has been granted and the decision automatically quashed under CPR 54.7A(9)(b) or 
because the claimant is successful at full hearing) and the Upper Tribunal finding in favour of the claimant (which usually results in a decision of the 
First-tier tribunal being quashed). We recognise there is no like-for-like comparison possible with other kinds of Judicial Review, but the academic 
consensus supports the approach of comparing a reasonable metric of ‘success in a Cart Judicial Reviews’ with a reasonable metric of ‘success in a 
Judicial Reviews generally’. 




41. In their report, the IRAL Panel made no specific recommendations in relation to ouster 
clauses but maintained that Parliament could limit or exclude Judicial Review in particular 
circumstances if there are ‘highly cogent reasons’ for taking this course17. The Panel also 
regarded Parliament legislating to overturn certain cases, thus rendering specific ouster clauses 
effective, as a legitimate approach. In addition, the Panel’s recommendation to overturn Cart 
is, in the Government’s view, best achieved by an ouster clause, which led to our considering 
how ouster clauses could be made effective. 
42. The Government agreed that ouster clauses should be effective where there is sufficient 
justification and felt there might be merit in clarifying the principles of interpretation which 
the courts would have to apply when interpreting an ouster clause. Accordingly, Question 8 of 
the consultation document asked respondents whether the proposed methods (a framework), 
or alternatives, would achieve the aim of giving effect to ouster clauses. 
43. A significant majority of respondents were critical of a framework approach to ouster clauses, 
which they considered unjustified and insufficient to provide adequate protections for ousted 
decisions. This is due, in part, to the fact that interpretation is largely dictated by the specific 
circumstances before the court and the particular drafting of the clause, meaning that a one 
size fits all framework would not lessen confusion, but potentially add to it.
44. Non-government organisations tended to be against the idea of ouster clauses more generally 
due to concerns about the implications of such clauses when considered against the rule of 
law. Some respondents also expressed the view that the case for such a framework approach 
was not made by the analysis in the IRAL report and therefore the Government was not 
justified in pursuing it. 
45. A majority view held that, instead of creating a potentially faulty framework, the Government 
should divert its efforts to drafting more specific and tailored ouster clauses that are 
appropriate to the specific legislation at hand, which would be more likely to be welcomed 
by the courts and Parliament. It was considered that such efforts would be more likely to be 
successful, as judicial criticism is often centred on the appropriateness of ouster clauses to the 
particular legislation under consideration by the court.
Government response
46. The Government is persuaded by the majority view of respondents that a framework is too 
complicated and risks reducing rather than enhancing clarity and certainty around the law. On 
this basis it will not take this proposal forward. 
47. However, to ensure that the courts no longer render ouster clauses of no (or very limited) 
effect, where there is sufficient justification, the Government believes that an appropriate way 
to accomplish the objectives of (i) removing Cart Judicial Reviews and (ii) ensuring the courts 
give more effect to ouster clauses in the longer term where there is sufficient justification, is to 
propose a narrow ouster clause which focuses on removing the route of Cart Judicial Review. 
17  IRAL Report 2.89
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48. Prior to the Anisminic judgment18, it was well established that ouster clauses would not be 
interpreted as removing the potential for challenge by Judicial Review if the body acted in 
excess of its jurisdiction (i.e. beyond the scope of its powers)19, or, in cases of tribunals, acted 
in a fundamental breach of natural fairness20. However, if the body made an error within its 
competence then the courts gave effect to the ouster which removed from the decision the 
Judicial Review route of challenge. 
49. If the decision was made in excess of jurisdiction then the ouster would not remove Judicial 
Review; conversely if the decision was within jurisdiction then the ouster clause would 
remove Judicial Review. Anisminic did not reject the relevance of this distinction – which 
was reaffirmed in subsequent case-law21 - but the court did interpret the particular error of 
law as actually going to jurisdiction, leading to the decision being a nullity so that it was not 
protected by the ouster clause.
50. It is, in the Government’s view, highly unusual for Parliament to want to oust Judicial Review 
for truly jurisdictional errors, or for fundamental breaches of natural fairness.22 However, the 
judgment in Anisminic has widened the circumstances in which an error would be considered 
jurisdictional by the courts.
51. In response, Parliament passed wider ouster clauses which appeared to oust Judicial Review 
even for jurisdictional errors. This is what Parliament did in the provision at issue in Privacy 
International v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22. However, this still led to 
interpretative difficulties. 
52. The Government considers the issue is that to legislate is to communicate, and 
communication requires a common and stable language23. If there are no fixed and stable 
categories of jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional matters, this makes communication difficult. 
53. The Government believes there is a distinction between (1) excess of jurisdiction (the body 
didn’t have power to do what it did), (2) abuse of jurisdiction (the body breached principles of 
natural justice) and (3) all other errors, including errors of law. The Government also believes 
that, at least for quasi-judicial bodies, there is no rule of law issue with removing Judicial 
Review for (3)24. The Government thinks it would be unusual for Parliament to do so for (1) 
and (2). Following Privacy International, which involved discussion of such distinctions, the 
Government is confident the courts will accept the distinction between (1), (2) and (3), despite 
the possible existence of borderline cases. 
54. To ensure proportionality and to not exclude Judicial Review to any greater extent than is 
necessary, we have decided that the Cart ouster clause should not exclude Judicial Review for 
(1) and (2). 
55. The explicit Cart ouster clause, designed to meet the common law requirements for 
effectiveness, will be used as an example to guide the development of effective legislation in 
18  Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147
19  For example, Ex p Bradlaugh (1878) 3 QBD 509, 513 (Cockburn CJ)
20  For example, R v Cheltenham Comrs (1841) 1 QB 467, 113 ER 1211
21  South East Asia Fire Bricks Sdn Bhd v Non-Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Employees Union [1981] AC 363
22   That is not to say however, that in different contexts a different standard or type of ouster clause would be appropriate - for example in 
relation to re-affirming or restoring the non-justiciability of certain powers.
23  R. Ekins, The Nature of Legislative Intent, (OUP, 2012), p.126
24   On this point we agree with Professor Endicott that “the general rule of review for error of law is not justified by constitutional principle” 
(Administrative Law, 4th Ed, p. 330).
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the future. Furthermore, after legislating to implement an effective ouster in relation to Cart 
Judicial Review, the Government intends to carry out an internal follow-up exercise to identify 
and review (with a view to potentially updating where necessary) the other ouster clauses 
currently on the statute book, including the ouster clause in Privacy International.
Remedies
56. The IRAL Panel recommended providing the courts with additional remedial flexibility by giving 
them the power to grant a quashing order which will automatically take effect after a certain 
period of time if certain specified conditions are not met. The IRAL Panel did not, however, 
make any recommendation in relation to any power to remove or limit the retrospective 
effect of quashing orders. However, the idea of prospective-only quashing orders was raised in 
some of the submissions to the IRAL call for evidence and there is arguably a useful precedent 
contained within section 102 of the Scotland Act 1998, which allows a court or tribunal to 
make an order that removes or limits the retrospective effect of a decision in certain situations 
when a public body has acted beyond its competence. We considered this example relevant 
due to the wording of the legislative provisions giving powers to the courts to alter the effects 
of relief, and the inclusion of a factor to consider, rather than the circumstances in which such 
a power could be used. After careful consideration the Government decided there was merit in 
exploring this measure through consultation.
57. In their arguments concerning the suspending of quashing orders, the IRAL Panel discussed 
the limitations of the common law doctrine of nullity. This doctrine, as discussed in Ahmed 
(No.2)25, could undermine the effectiveness of quashing orders. The Government is further 
concerned with the application of nullity relating to issues of legal certainty and remedial 
discretion. The Government was interested in clarifying the principles which determine how 
the courts declare nullity by operation of law. The consultation proposed possible principles. 
58. The IRAL Panel did not make recommendations regarding the implementation of any proposal 
to suspend quashing orders beyond suggesting some wording for amendment to the Senior 
Courts Act 1981. The Government was interested in examining factors which the courts might 
consider when deciding whether to suspend a quashing order or make it prospective-only, 
with a view to providing greater certainty for both parties. The consultation proposed possible 
factors in providing guidance to the courts. 
59. The IRAL Panel gave a name to such orders, calling them ‘Suspended Quashing Orders’, which 
the Government duly used in its consultation alongside ‘Prospective-only Remedies’. However, 
importantly, these are not entirely new remedies, rather the ability to suspend a quashing 
order is a modification of the effect of a quashing order. As such, in this consultation response, 
to avoid confusion as to whether any new remedies are being introduced as opposed to new 
methods of modifying existing remedies, terms such as ‘Suspended Quashing Order’ will not be 
used, with terms akin to ‘a power to suspend the effects of a quashing order’ being preferred 
for their accuracy. 
25 HM Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 5
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Suspending the effects of quashing orders
60. Together with overturning Cart, ‘creating a suspended quashing order’ was one of the IRAL 
Panel’s two substantive recommendations. The Panel recommended the introduction of a 
wide discretion to suspend the effects of quashing orders to increase flexibility in allowing 
the court to tailor its remedies better to the facts of the case, giving a more just outcome to 
both parties. 
61. The Government agreed with the Panel. By giving the decision-maker the opportunity to 
make good any errors, instead of immediately quashing the decision, the measure maintains 
the effectiveness of remedies for citizens, while ensuring that those remedies do not impede 
effective government. Accordingly, the Government was interested in examining ways this 
provision could be implemented through the consultation. 
62. There were 110 responses to Questions 1 and 6, which asked respondents if they considered 
it appropriate to use precedent from section 102 of the Scotland Act26 1998 (i.e. to have a 
discretion guided by a list of factors), or the suggestion from the IRAL Panel of an unguided 
discretion to suspend the effects of a quashing order. Furthermore, respondents were asked 
whether there is merit in creating a presumption that quashing orders be suspended, or a 
requirement for them to be.
63. Most responses were in favour of introducing a wide discretion to be afforded to judges, 
in preference to any approach that included factors27, presumptions or requirements. A 
significant proportion refused to consider the remedy being implemented in any way other 
than as a discretion. Almost all respondents were opposed to mandating the suspension 
of quashing orders, citing myriad examples of where suspension would be inappropriate or 
unfair to impose.
64. However, respondents raised concerns about a discretion to suspend quashing orders guided 
by factors. For example, some felt that an increased availability of remedies and factors 
would give rise to satellite litigation, which in turn would increase the length and cost of 
Judicial Reviews. 
Government response 
65. Following the definition provided by the IRAL Panel, in the Government’s consultation 
document a Suspended Quashing Order was defined as a quashing order given by the courts, 
the effect of which was delayed to give the defendant time to comply with conditions set by 
the court. If the conditions were met, the quashing order would not take effect at the end of 
the period of suspension. Respondents helpfully pointed out that this definition conflated two 
separate remedial discretions: 
• A suspension of the effects of a quashing order: A quashing order modified to be 
suspended for a limited period of time, giving a party time to make transitional 
arrangements to deal with the effects of the impending quashing. No conditions 
26   Section 102 of the Scotland Act gives the court discretionary powers to suspend the effect of Scottish primary or secondary legislation, or a 
decision by a member of the Scottish Government, and requires the courts to have regard to a sole factor, being any adverse interests of third 
parties.
27   Respondents gave feedback on some proposed factors including (a) whether the procedural defect can be remedied (b) whether remedial 
action to comply with a suspended order would be particularly onerous/complex/costly and (c) whether the cost of compensation for 
remedying quashed provisions would be excessive
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are attached to this order, and the order simply allows for transitional arrangements 
to be made.
• A conditionally withheld quashing order: a granting of a quashing order that is withheld 
for a period of time with conditions attached, to allow a party to take steps for the 
defect to be corrected by satisfying those conditions. If the conditions are fulfilled, then 
the quashing order will not come into effect. This potentially allows the public body 
to obviate the quashing order coming into effect if the conditions set by the court are 
satisfied. 
66. To this end, the consultation exercise helped to define these two elements of the IRAL 
suggestion as separate ideas. Notably, the two variants are useful in different instances: 
suspending the effect of quashing orders can be used where defects are large, giving the 
defendant time in the intervening period to remake its decision in a lawful manner, enact any 
transitional arrangements, or even seek to legislate (potentially retrospectively) to preserve 
the state of the law as it was before the quashing order was made. None of these actions 
(apart from primary legislation to give the Government power which it previously lacked 
with retrospective effect) may lead to the validation of the quashed decision, reversal of the 
quashing order or removal or further limitation to the effect of that quashing order. This is the 
order as envisaged in HM Treasury v Ahmed (no. 2) [2010] UKSC 2, with the quashing order 
being final, but with a period of time to prepare for it coming into force. 
67. A quashing order that is conditionally withheld would be appropriate in a situation where the 
defect is minor. For example, the courts could use such an order to require the defendant to 
publish previously unpublished data or policies where this was required. This modified order 
could save the defendant time in remaking entire decisions where there was only a flaw in a 
distinct part of the decision-making process. 
68. That being said, the Government has decided not to pursue the introduction of a specific 
power  to conditionally withhold quashing orders. In undertaking analysis on this measure, 
the Government considered that there are significant issues. Firstly, in determining whether a 
condition has been complied with in deciding whether this led to a decision being quashed, 
a second hearing may often be required. This would increase the length of Judicial Review 
proceedings and create practical difficulties in relation to costs and appeals. Secondly, and in 
light of this, the Government considers that the extremely limited circumstances in which 
this particular type of remedy would be suitable do not justify the potential uncertainty 
and practical difficulties created by this power. In any case, the Government considers 
that the current array of remedies, coupled with the suspended and retrospectively limited 
quashing orders being introduced by the Judicial Review and Courts Bill, will be sufficient 
to give the courts remedial flexibility – and can, used in combination, allow a defendant to 
remake or modify a decision without prejudicing past use of that decision. Moreover, not 
proceeding with a specific power to conditionally withhold quashing orders does not affect 
the current common law powers of the court, or their ability to use their remedial powers to 
similar effect. 28
69. Respondents were concerned about the increased likelihood of satellite litigation which 
could increase the length of litigation. The Government considers, however, that this is a 
potential risk with any change in the law, and that it does not undermine the effectiveness 
28 For example, in Plan B Earth v Secretary of State for Transport [2020] EWCA Civ 214 demonstrated a creative approach taken by the Court of 
Appeal to granting remedies. On appeal the Supreme Court held that there had not been anything unlawful and so they did not consider the remedial 
question ([2020] UKSC 52 at [167]).
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of introducing an ability to suspend quashing orders (as well as an ability to limit the 
retrospective effect of quashing orders, as discussed below). 
70. Respondents further argued that the proposed measures could lead to poor administration. 
On the contrary, the Government considers that suspending a quashing order would 
considerably improve administration, by limiting the need for large regulatory regimes to be 
hastily re-created in light of a quashing order, as the defendant is given time to remake the 
original decision. Finally, many respondents considered that Ahmed (No.2) did not preclude 
suspending quashing orders. But the point at stake in Ahmed (No.2) was not about that kind 
of suspension. The court in that case saw the invalidity of the decision being performative, 
and affecting its legal status rather than the quashing order making it so. Therefore, the 
court found that a quashing order that was suspended would be pointless, as it would not 
affect the underlying invalidity. However, the Government wishes for any ambiguity as to 
the effectiveness of these remedies to be resolved and therefore is making explicit provision 
that the use of the new remedial powers has the effect of deeming the impugned decision 
as valid for all intents and purposes, as if that validity had not been impaired by the defect, 
for whatever time-period the court specifies. The Government also wishes for this remedial 
modification to be more regularly considered and used; the Government does not consider 
the suspension of a quashing order as only being appropriate in the most exceptional 
circumstances, rather it should be used more commonly. 
71. The Government is content that this measure, which includes the court turning its attention 
to certain factors, will develop a helpful body of jurisprudence. The cases highlighted by 
respondents in relation s.102 of the Scotland Act (albeit in a different context) indicate that 
there is considerable scope for development here, and that jurisprudence will help guide the 
consistency with which these factors are used.
72. An ability to suspend a quashing order will allow the courts to improve administration 
by ensuring the defendant has time to thoroughly consider any replacement decision or 
regulation, which would not be the case with an immediate quashing. 
73. In light of the arguments raised in the responses to the consultation, the Government 
will legislate for a general discretion with a non-exhaustive list of factors for the courts 
to consider when deciding whether this remedy is suitable. The list of factors will respect 
the discretion of the court and will therefore focus on general principles, rather 
than imposing prescriptive conditions. This should aid consistency as the courts consider when 
and how to grant the new modified order. Factors will include whether immediate quashing 
would prejudice the interests or expectations of third parties and will be phrased neutrally in 
the statute.  
Limiting the retrospective effect of quashing orders
74. In their report, the IRAL Panel made no recommendations in relation to removing or limiting 
the retrospective effect of quashing to make them prospective-only. However, as with 
suspending the effects of quashing orders, there is precedent for such a measure, albeit in a 
slightly different context, in section 102 of the Scotland Act. The Government was interested 
in exploring, through consultation, the introduction of prospective-only remedies, to be used at 
the discretion of the court, in accordance with certain principles. The intention of this measure 
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is to provide the courts with an option to apply a remedy in the future only, rather than 
retrospectively, and increasing certainty in relation to administrative action. 
75. There were 110 responses to questions 4 and 5 which asked respondents whether a 
discretionary power for prospective-only remedies should be introduced, and if so, whether a 
presumptive or mandatory approach be taken.
76. There was disagreement between respondents. While some agreed with introducing an ability 
to limit the retrospective effect of quashing orders, others raised principled and practical 
concerns and there was significant resistance to a presumption or requirement due to 
concern that it would lead to injustice. These arguments, broadly following those set out in 
Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] UKHL 41, suggest that granting prospective-only quashing orders 
places the courts in a quasi-legislative position (making law, rather than declaring what it 
is and always has been), and discriminate between the claimant and those potential future 
claimants with similar claims. 
77. It was often highlighted by respondents that quashing orders with a limited retrospective 
effect could leave the claimant without a remedy, and this could deter claimants from bringing 
a claim. It was also noted that quashing orders with limited retrospective effect would uphold 
unlawful action and enable the defendant to leave maladministration unrectified.
78. It was also argued that the use of prospective-only remedies would place a significant 
emphasis on the speed of the litigation process itself. Claimants might well seek expedition, 
and shorter time scales, in order to expand the class of those potentially able to benefit from 
a successful judgment. It was suggested that this would place increased pressure on both 
defendants and the courts to deal with litigation in a shorter timescale.
79. Other respondents saw merit in the proposals. Some noted that there is nothing radical about 
consequences being prospective-only and that judgments of this nature have been made in 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. Other respondents highlighted that the ability to 
make quashing orders prospective-only emphasises the remedial flexibility of the courts and 
stops the doctrine of nullity (as explored below) from undermining judicial discretion. Finally, it 
was noted that prospective-only quashing orders do exist, as highlighted by Re Spectrum Plus 
Ltd [2005] UKHL 41, but that they are limited to exceptional circumstances. 
80. Respondents suggested that any use of factors to guide the court’s discretion would lead to 
satellite litigation. 
81. Once again, a presumption and a requirement were generally not favoured. Respondents 
raised instances where a retrospectively modified quashing order would not be appropriate, 
and one highlighted a period of six years in which only seven statutory instruments had been 
retrospectively quashed. Respondents noted that the courts may struggle to get around a 
presumption, leading to the fossilisation effect as described above. 
Government response 
82. It is the Government’s view that the argument for increased remedial flexibility extends 
to providing the courts with a power to make quashing orders prospective-only in effect. 
Giving judges the discretion to provide a prospective-only remedy will mean that, in certain 
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situations, the adverse effects of retrospective quashing may be avoided – such as severe 
administrative or economic consequences. The Government’s intention is that the court’s 
discretion to grant this type of remedy will be guided by a non-exhaustive list of factors.
83. The Government notes the points expressed by respondents, but it considers that the concerns 
raised do not substantially undermine the rationale for having a discretionary power for these 
remedial modifications. The Government does not consider that limiting the retrospective 
effect of quashing orders prevents good administration, rather it enhances it. Legal certainty 
is retained, as third parties can rely on a regulatory regime being upheld in the past, and then 
corrected in the future (once a defendant has passed remedial legislation). Public resources are 
therefore spent making a regulatory regime work, as opposed to being focussed on resolving 
retrospective reliance. 
84. Furthermore, the Government considers that by providing such powers as a discretion 
for judges to use, issues of claimants being deprived of a remedy, discrimination between 
claimants, listing issues, and deterring claimants can all be avoided. The Government considers 
that this provides a safeguard, as it has done in the Court of Justice of the European Union, for 
instance, from which lessons can be learned as to how this remedy can be applied. 
85. The use of the power to give prospective relief operates in the same way as suspending relief, 
in terms of the deemed validity of the impugned act.
Factors to guide the court’s discretion 
86. The Government proposed that any discretionary power of the courts should be guided by 
certain factors set out in legislation that are to be considered by the court. The Government 
considered that such factors would be helpful in providing consistency and expanding the 
jurisprudence as to how these remedial modifications are used. This should provide greater 
certainty for both parties, so the Government consulted on which factors would be appropriate 
in providing guidance to the courts. 
87. Question 4, which asked respondents which factors they consider relevant in determinations 
for prospective-only remedies, elicited 119 responses. 
88. Most respondents considered that the current system is robust enough and that prescribing 
factors would risk limiting judicial discretion to determine what should be taken into account 
in deciding whether the remedy is appropriate in individual cases. However, some suggested 
potential factors that could be used if the Government wished to include a non-exhaustive list 
of factors to guide the court’s discretion.
89. The consultation document set out several examples of factors the courts might use. 
Respondents had mixed views about their efficacy, but 40 factors were suggested by 
respondents themselves. Some said that any legislation would need sufficient flexibility to 
allow for principles to be developed through case law, so it was important that any list of 
factors was non-exhaustive. 
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Government response 
90. The Government is of the view that there is merit in having factors for the courts to consider, 
rather than the courts having complete discretion. The Government has concluded that, in 
deciding whether to prospectively quash a power or suspend the quashing the following 
factors should be taken into account by the courts: 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the relevant defect;
(2) any detriment to good administration that would result from exercising or failing to 
exercise the power;
(3) the interests or expectations of persons who would benefit from the quashing of the 
impugned act;
(4) the interests or expectations of persons who have relied on the impugned act;
(5) so far as appears to the court to be relevant, any action taken or proposed to be taken, or 
undertaking given, by a person with responsibility in connection with the impugned act;
(6) any other matter that appears to the court to be relevant.
91. This is a non-exhaustive list and it is not framed to justify any particular remedy, but rather to 
ensure a well-reasoned conclusion for any remedy that is granted. 
92. Respondents were opposed to using ‘economic impacts’ as a factor, as it would draw the 
judges into the policy space. The Government agrees and is not pursuing this as part of any 
factor. Other factors29 were not adopted on the basis that they were too complex, used novel 
terminology, or required the court and parties to consider questions that were not relevant.
Presumptions
93. The Government proposed that a presumption might be used to guide the courts’ discretion in 
the use of any or all the new remedial powers. In some cases, this would be on a specific basis, 
as discussed above in relation to statutory instruments. In others it would be a more general 
presumption to use one or all the new remedial powers by default.
94. A large majority of respondents argued against the use of presumptions in any circumstances, 
generally citing concerns over fettering judicial discretion or potential injustice to claimants 
if it was less likely they would receive equitable relief due to a presumption against it. 
Respondents raised examples where such a presumption would cause injustice. 
95. Some respondents saw advantages in terms of legal certainty, and thought that a presumption 
balanced that need with the requirements of justice better than a requirement, but 
nevertheless would tip the balance too far. However, others noted that a presumption may 
attract satellite litigation to test its bounds, and the operation of the presumption might not 
be clarified for some time. 
29   Other considerations that Government suggested included: a) whether the procedural defect can be remedied, b) whether remedial action to 
comply with a suspended order would be particularly onerous/complex/costly, c) whether the cost of compensation for remedying quashed 
provisions would be excessive (Government Response paragraph 56).
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Government Response
96. The Government is not persuaded that no form of presumption could ever be appropriate. 
A presumption does not necessarily seek to constrain or limit the courts’ discretion, so long 
as it is rebuttable by wide enough principles to allow the courts to give relief in a form they 
consider just. What a presumption can do, is direct and guide the court’s reasoning to certain 
outcomes in certain circumstances.
97. The Government believes that the new remedial powers offer adequate redress to claimants 
in the right circumstances. The list of factors set out above give some idea of the kind of 
situations in which different forms of relief could be appropriate. The remedial powers also 
provide an opportunity for more practical remedies, tailored to the circumstances of the 
case. The advantages of defendants being able to prepare for the effects of a quashing order 
are significant in terms of saving time, ensuring that decisions are made in the right way or 
providing for alternative arrangements to be brought in - including remaking or amending 
decisions. Similarly, there may be significant advantages to third parties being able to rely on 
past actions taken pursuant to an impugned decision. 
98. Therefore, in the right circumstances, where they can provide adequate redress, the 
Government thinks the courts should consider using the new remedial powers. The further 
factor included in the presumption – for the court to consider anything that may be done 
further to any conditions that the court may set – also emphasises the practical aspects of 
remedial discretion and encourages defendants to think of any undertakings they might give.
99.  In this way the Government hopes to encourage the use of the new remedial powers, and 
development of practical, clear and consistent principles for their use, for which the list of 
factors provides a basis. 
Nullity
100. In their report the IRAL Panel discussed the limitations of the common law doctrine of nullity. 
The application of the principle of nullity is of concern to the Government as it has two chief 
disadvantages. Firstly, its use undermines legal certainty, especially (as noted by the Panel) as 
it is used inconsistently. Secondly, it removes the court’s remedial discretion (as it arguably 
undermines the effect of a quashing order). The Government was interested in clarifying the 
principles which determine how the courts declare nullity. In the consultation document, 
the Government proposed several principles which lead to a decision being a nullity by 
operation of law. 
101. Question 7, which asked respondents whether they agreed that legislating for the 
Government’s proposals would provide clarity, elicited 107 responses. Most respondents 
were wary of making changes to address what is primarily an academic/theoretical concern, 
rather than a practical one. Many respondents noted that changes could have significant 
and undesired consequences including increased uncertainty in the law, leading to satellite 
litigation over the effect of any additional or redrafted provision of nullity in the law. It was 
also noted that nullity operates distinctly in other areas of law, so changing nullity in the 
public law context was highly likely to cause unintended consequences. Additional arguments 
against reform affirmed the importance of the courts’ discretion as to what (if any) remedy 
to grant. Ultimately, respondents considered that reform of nullity was not needed to make 
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the proposed new remedial powers effective, and that simply expressing the availability 
of suspended and prospective quashing orders would be sufficient to encourage judges 
to use them.
Government response
102. The Government (alongside many respondents) is concerned about the effect of nullity on the 
operation of the proposed remedial modifications. However, in light of the comments from 
respondents, the Government agrees that the proposed reforms are unnecessary so long as the 
relevant provisions are drafted to ensure that the legal concept of nullity does not undermine 
the new remedial powers, and that courts have discretion over which remedies they apply. 
103. The IRAL panel, academics and the courts themselves30 have recognised the complexities of 
the theory around nullity and the ambiguities it can create. Our reforms seek to emphasise 
the practical nature of Judicial Review and such practical benefit should not become tangled 
in complex conceptual conundrums. We hope that the courts will use the new powers 
available to them, and in so doing develop the common law away from the strict principles 
and requirements of automatic nullity, and towards more pragmatic adjudication. In the final 
analysis, Judicial Review should support and promote good administration, a position not 
amenable to inflexible concepts which can have drastic real-world implications.
Procedural reforms
104. Questions 9 to 16 in the consultation document considered procedural reforms. As these 
reforms would not require primary legislation, but rather would be matters for the CPRC, they 
are not a relevant consideration for the Judicial Review and Courts Bill. Responses to these 
questions will be analysed and responded to at a later date. 
Other
105. Question 3 asked whether the Government’s proposals, where they potentially impact the 
devolved nations, should be limited to England and Wales. Respondents highlighted the tension 
between respecting the autonomy of the Devolved Administrations by limiting measures to 
the jurisdiction of England and Wales and creating a two-tier Judicial Review system in the UK. 
For proposals relating to the overturning of Cart, a full devolution analysis was conducted to 
inform the position that measures will apply to matters of reserved policy only. 
106. Question 17 asked respondents to share information relevant to the Government’s impact 
assessment, while question 18 asked for information relevant to the Government’s assessment 
of equalities impacts. Responses to both questions were considered and have informed 
the full Impact Assessment (which is available online) and the Public Sector Equality Duty 
(PSED) analysis (which is also available online). Question 19 asked respondents to highlight 
mitigations the Government should consider in further developing the proposals in the 
consultation. Responses to this question have been covered throughout the present document 
within individual themes.
30  IRAL Report 3.60-3.64
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Conclusion 
107. The Government is very grateful for the many responses to the consultation, the quality 
of which was generally high. Judicial Review is an important subject and the responses did 
justice to this. 
108. As the present document sets out, the consultation has allowed the Government to review and 
revise its original proposals. 
109. The measures to be taken forward are contained in the Judicial Review and Courts Bill which is 
published alongside this consultation response.
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Contact details
This document is the Government response to the consultation document: Judicial Review Reform - 
The Government Response to the Independent Review of Administrative Law.
A Welsh language translation of this consultation response will be available at https://www.gov.uk/
government/consultations/judicial-review-reform.
Further copies of this Government response to the consultation can be obtained by contacting 
Judicial Review Reform team at the address below and it is also available on-line at https://
consult.justice.gov.uk/.
By mail to: 
Judicial Review Reform 
Ministry of Justice 
102 Petty France 
London SW1H 9AJ
Or by email to
judicialreview@justice.gov.uk
The consultation document is also available at https://consult.justice.gov.uk/
Complaints or comments
If you have any complaints or comments about the consultation process you should contact the 
Ministry of Justice at the above address.
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Consultation principles
The principles that government departments and other public bodies should adopt for engaging 
stakeholders when developing policy and legislation are set out in the consultation principles.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consultation-principles-guidance
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Annex B – Glossary
Administrative Court: The Administrative Court is part of the Queen’s Bench Division of the High 
Court (one of the three divisions of the High Court, together with the Chancery Division and Family 
Division). It hears most kinds of applications for Judicial Review and some statutory appeals and 
applications which fall outside the remit of this Glossary.31
Anisminic: Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 is a constitutional 
law case that established the “collateral fact doctrine”, which holds that any error of law made by 
a public body will make its decision a nullity and that an ouster clause does not deprive the courts 
from their jurisdiction in Judicial Review unless this is expressly stated.
Claimant(s): The claimant is the person affected by a decision of a public body who wishes to 
challenge that decision in the Administrative Court. The claimant Judicial Review proceedings can 
be any individual or incorporated company (also known as a corporation). Partnerships are able to 
bring proceedings in the name of the partnership.32
Defendant(s): The defendant in Judicial Review proceedings is the public body / public office 
holder which made the decision that is being challenged (or which failed to make a decision where 
that failure is challenged), not the individual within that public body or public office who made 
the decision.33
Grounds of review: There are limited grounds by which someone can bring a Judicial Review. 
Grounds of Judicial Review are limited to considering the lawfulness of how a decision has been 
made, not the merits of that decision. These include challenging a decision on illegality, irrationality, 
procedural unfairness or breach of natural justice (due to a sufficient breach of fairness via a 
tribunal member being biased, for instance).
Interested Parties: An interested party is defined as any person (including a corporation or 
partnership), other than the claimant or defendant, who is directly affected by the claim.34
Judicial review: Judicial Review is the process by which a judge reviews the lawfulness of a decision 
or action made by a public body, specifically looking at how the decision was made, rather than the 
rights and wrongs of the conclusion reached.
Justiciability: In the present context, justiciability is the concept governing whether a public power 
is subject to Judicial Review or not. If a power is justiciable, then the power can be challenged 
via Judicial Review. If a power cannot be challenged by Judicial Review, then it is considered non-
justiciable. In this view, justiciability sets the limits of the court’s authority over certain matters. 
Limiting the prospective effect of a quashing order: Normally, quashing orders apply 
retrospectively, i.e. a quashed power has never had legal effect, including in the past. Prospective 
quashing limits this aspect,so that those who have relied on a challenged provision in the past can 
continue to rely on it. 
31  The Administrative Court: Judicial Review Guide 2020, section 2.2., available here: The Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2020 
(publishing.service.gov.uk).
32  Ibid, section 1.7.1.
33  Ibid., section 2.2.2.1.
34  Ibid., section 2.2.3.1.
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Mandatory Order: A mandatory order is the order the court can make to compel a public body to 
act in a particular way.35 
Nullity: A nullity is a finding of unlawfulness to the effect that a power under review has never 
been used or exercised. This means that any exercise of a power has no legal effect and effectively 
never existed. 
Ouster clauses: A mechanism by which powers can be made non-justiciable after they have 
previously been ruled so.
Quashing Order: A quashing order quashes, or sets aside, the decision, thereby confirming that the 
challenged decision has no lawful force and no legal effect. After making a quashing order the court 
will generally remit the matter to the public body decision maker and direct it to reconsider the 
matter and reach a fresh decision in accordance with the judgment of the court. 36
Remedies: When the claimant starts a claim, they must state in section 7 of the Claim Form what 
remedy they seek from the court in the event that they are successful. There are six remedies 
available to a successful claimant in Judicial Review proceedings.37
35  Ibid., section 11.3.1.
36  Ibid., section 11.4.
37  Ibid., section 11.2.
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Annex C – List of Consultation 
questions
Question 1: Do you consider it appropriate to use precedent from section 102 of the Scotland 
Act, or to use the suggestion of the Review in providing for discretion to issue a suspended 
quashing order? 
Question 2: Do you have any views as to how best to achieve the aims of the proposals in relation 
to Cart Judicial Reviews and suspended quashing orders? 
Question 3: Do you think the proposals in this document, where they impact the devolved 
jurisdictions, should be limited to England and Wales only? 
Question 4: (a) Do you agree that a further amendment should be made to section 31 of the 
Senior Courts Act to provide a discretionary power for prospective-only remedies? If so, (b) 
which factors do you consider would be relevant in determining whether this remedy would be 
appropriate? 
Question 5: Do you agree that the proposed approaches in (a) and (b) will provide greater 
certainty over the use of Statutory Instruments, which have already been scrutinised by 
Parliament? Do you think a presumptive approach (a) or a mandatory approach (b) would be more 
appropriate? 
Question 6: Do you agree that there is merit in requiring suspended quashing orders to be used in 
relation to powers more generally? Do you think the presumptive approach in (a) or the mandatory 
approach in (b) would be more appropriate? 
Question 7: Do you agree that legislating for the above proposals will provide clarity in relation 
to when the courts can and should make a determination that a decision or use of a power was 
null and void? 
Question 8: Would the methods outlined above, or a different method, achieve the aim of giving 
effect to ouster clauses? 
Question 9: Do you agree that the CPRC should be invited to remove the promptitude requirement 
from Judicial Review claims? The result will be that claims must be brought within three months. 
Question 10: Do you think that the CPRC should be invited to consider extending the time limit to 
encourage pre-action resolution? 
Question 11: Do you think that the CPRC should be invited to consider allowing parties to agree 
to extend the time limits to bring a Judicial Review claim, bearing in mind the potential impacts on 
third parties? 
Question 12: Do you think it would be useful to invite the CPRC to consider whether a ‘track’ 
system is viable for Judicial Review claims? What would allocation depend on? 
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Question 13: Do you consider it would be useful to introduce a requirement to identify 
organisations or wider groups that might assist in litigation? 
Question 14: Do you agree that the CPRC should be invited to include a formal provision for an 
extra step for a Reply, as outlined above? 
Question 15: As set out in para 105(a) above, do you agree it is worth inviting the CPRC to 
consider whether to change the obligations surrounding Detailed Grounds of Resistance? 
Question 16: Is it appropriate to invite the CPRC to consider increasing the time limit required by 
CPR54.14 to 56 days? 
Question 17: Do you have any information that you believe would be useful for the Government 
to consider in developing a full impact assessment on the proposals in this consultation document? 
Question 18: Do you have any information that you consider could be helpful in assisting the 
Government in further developing its assessment of the equalities impacts of these proposals? 
Question 19: Are there any mitigations the Government should consider in developing its 
proposals further? Please provide data and reasons.
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Annex D – Stakeholder engagement
During the consultation period a significant amount of engagement with stakeholders was 
undertaken. It consisted of: 
• Three roundtable meetings between Ministry of Justice officials and 14 academic lawyers. 
• With the assistance of the Bar Council, one webinar where Ministry of Justice officials 
presented, and responded to questions, on the consultation proposals to an audience of 
around 50 barristers and one roundtable meeting between Ministry of Justice officials and a 
smaller group of barristers nominated by the Bar Council. 
• With the assistance of the Law Society, we held one webinar where Ministry of Justice 
officials presented, and responded to questions, on the consultation proposals to an 
audience of around 55 solicitors and two roundtable meetings with smaller groups of 
solicitors nominated by the Law Society. 
• A roundtable meeting with 11 advocacy groups, namely Liberty, Justice, Mind, Amnesty 
International, Public Law Project, Legal Action Group, Law Centres Network, JustRight 
Scotland, Child Poverty Action Group, Committee on the Administration of Justice, and 
Access Charity.
• Officials also engaged with Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland government 
officials during and after the consultation to ensure that their perspectives were considered 
within the policy development process.   
• In order to improve their understanding of how Cart Judicial Reviews work in practice, policy 
officials have met with members of the judiciary. This engagement was within the 
framework of the judiciary’s guidelines for engaging with the Executive and approved by the 
Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice. 
• Officials also met with Mikołaj Barczentewicz, of Surrey University, who shared his research 
on Cart Judicial Review cases. 
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Annex E – Cart statistical analysis
1  The total number of Cart Judicial Review cases brought to the Administrative Court against the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) decisions 
from 1 Jan 2018 - 31 Dec 2019 was 1,249 excluding cases pending a Upper 
Tribunal Appeal decision. Of these, 92 resulted in the Upper Tribunal decision 
being quashed. In the relevant period the Upper Tribunal gave permission to 85 
cases post-remittal (excluding cases pending a decision). Of the 85, to date 42 
have been successful, 43 unsuccessful. 13 cases are still awaiting a decision by 
the Upper Tribunal.
2  In summary, on the basis of the data we are able to say that the ‘success rate’ of Cart cases is substantially lower than the average success rate for other 
types of Judicial Review which is typically in a range of 30% to 50%. For Cart 
Judicial Review, the ‘success rate’ is around 3.4% - ie the number of cases found 
in favour of the claimant by the Upper Tribunal in an appeal which followed a 
remitted grant of permission following a Cart Judicial Review, divided by the 
total number of applications for a Cart Judicial Review in the period in question. 
Success Rates’ of Cart Judicial Reviews
Background
1. ‘Success’ in Judicial Reviews is notoriously difficult to measure. The commonly accepted 
methodology is to look first at the number of cases recorded as ‘found in favour of the 
claimant’ at a substantive hearing, as recorded in the Civil Justice Statistics, and then to 
estimate and include the number of cases which were settled by the defendant or withdrawn 
by the claimant prior to a substantive hearing. 
2. Several academic studies exist on this, and the commonly accepted figure is that between a 
third and half of Judicial Review claims settle in favour of the claimant. Going further than 
this, some studies use interviews with claimants to estimate how many felt they had gained a 
tangible or intangible benefit as a result of bringing a Judicial Review, regardless of whether a 
court found in their favour. On this measure Judicial Reviews may be thought to be successful 
in up to 60% of cases.
3. Measuring success in Cart Judicial Reviews is slightly different, as the claimant is using the 
Judicial Review to try to get the Upper Tribunal to hear an appeal against a decision of the 
First-tier Tribunal. It is generally accepted that not only the outcome of the Cart Judicial 
Review process itself is important, but also any subsequent decision of the Upper Tribunal 
regarding the appeal against the First-tier Tribunal. 
4. This is what the IRAL panel attempted to measure, However, the data set they examined has 
been challenged as insufficient on several counts. Firstly, that the databases they examined 
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would be unlikely to have complete records of Cart Judicial Review cases (both in the 
Administrative Court and Upper Tribunal) and secondly they did not take into account that 
cases may be settled as a result of a Cart Judicial Review claim. The Government therefore 
agrees with respondents to the consultation that the IRAL figure of 0.22% is too low.
5. The IRAL Report’s process for identifying success numbers was to look through the databases 
Westlaw and BAILI for all cases involving a Cart Judicial Review since its inception. They found 
45 reports/transcripts, with 12 positive results. However, Westlaw and BAILI only record cases 
which set precedent in some way in terms of the judgment or case. Therefore, these reports 
and transcripts, and the associated judgements, only relate to small amount of the actual 
number of successful Cart Judicial Review cases during that time. 
Methodology
6. Our analysis aimed to trace the outcome of every Immigration Cart case remitted back to the 
Upper Tribunal, through comparison between the Upper Tribunal’s (Immigration and Asylum 
Chamber) internal case management data and the HMCTS ARIA database. This exercise 
focused on immigration cases because these make up 92% of Cart cases and the rate at which 
non-immigration Cart cases are given permission is extremely low (1.67% 2012-2020). 
7. For this analysis, success in a Cart Judicial Review was defined as:
• Permission has been given by the High Court for an application for Judicial Review of an 
Upper Tribunal decision on permission to appeal; and
• The appeal has been remitted back to the Upper Tribunal; and
• The appeal went to an appeal hearing in the Upper Tribunal and was found in favour of 
the claimant. 
8. We firstly assessed the number of Cart Judicial Reviews granted permission by the High 
Court. CPR 54.7A(9)(b) states that permission being given in a Cart Judicial Review 
automatically leads to the Upper Tribunal permission to appeal decision being quashed, 
unless one of the parties requests a hearing. From 2012-2020 339 out of 6,293 Cart Judicial 
Reviews were granted permission. This equates to 5.69% (immigration) as the upper 
limit for potentially ‘successful’ Cart Judicial Reviews over this period – in that they have a 
chance of leading to the Upper Tribunal quashing the decision of the First-tier Tribunal in an 
appeal. Looking only at more recent years (2016-2020) the figure is 5.69% (Immigration) 
9. In determining settlement rates, the Home Office settlement rate was looked at, as they are 
party to a number of Cart Judicial Review (as these often concern Immigration and Asylum). 
A Cart Judicial Review is a challenge to the decision of the Upper Tribunal and although the 
Home Office is an interested party it does not normally substantively engage with Cart 
Judicial Reviews. When a Judicial Review is granted permission, there is a period of time where 
interested parties can intervene to request a full hearing, beyond which the case is remitted to 
the Upper Tribunal. The Home Office do not usually intervene at this stage, meaning that the 
settlement rate here is negligible, and the case is remitted.
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10. The Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) was able to assess the outcomes of 
appeal hearings following a Cart Judicial Review from 1 Jan 2018 to 31 Dec 2020. This was 
done by finding the cases remitted back to the Upper Tribunal as a result of a Cart Judicial 
Review in the OPTIC database and from manual trawl of internal case management files. The 
OPTIC database records the Judicial Review case number as well as the original claim ID.
11. The original claim ID was then fed into the ARIA database, which would give a return on the 
case ID showing the outcome of any Upper Tribunal appeal decision, or if the case was pending 
a decision. 
12. In this way, the outcome of every case recorded as being remitted back to the Upper Tribunal 
could be ascertained.
Caveats
13. There is a slight disparity between the total number of Cart Judicial Review applications 
recorded by the Administrative Court (1,249) and the Upper Tribunal (1,192) in the period (1 
Jan 2018 – 31 Dec 2019).  We believe the reasons for this disparity are as follows:  
14. The Administrative Court records a case as being in the year in which the claim was issued 
and the Tribunal records a case as being in the year in which the Tribunal was served with it – 
it is not uncommon for claimants to serve the Tribunal late, or indeed not at all, particularly 
if they are litigants in person. Hence there may be cases not recorded by the Upper Tribunal 
(particularly if the cases did not reach a permission decision) at all or would be recorded in 
subsequent years. An application made in 2019 to the High Court may be recorded as a 2020 
case by the Upper Tribunal. Similarly, the Upper Tribunal would record cases at the beginning of 
the period for which the application was made before 1 Jan 2018. However, this may mean the 
timing discrepancy is balanced out.
15. The Upper Tribunal data only shows Cart Judicial Review which have outcomes or are pending 
an appeal decision. Data from the Administrative Court includes Judicial Reviews which are still 
live, and thus would not appear in the Upper Tribunal statistics.
16. Otherwise many of the cases not recorded by the Tribunal were likely to be Judicial Reviews 
which fell out of the system for one of the following reasons:
(1) struck out before the permission stage for non-compliance with the Civil Procedure Rules 
or court directions (for example failure to provide a Certificate of Service or file copies of 
the relevant appeal decisions),  
(2) withdrawn by the Claimants before the permission stage because they obtained a fresh 
immigration decision or grant of leave from the Home Office,  
(3) abandoned after the Claimants left or were removed from the UK, or  
(4) transferred to the Upper Tribunal Judicial Review jurisdiction after the court ascertained 
the decision under challenge was in fact a First-tier Tribunal decision on the timeliness 
or validity of the appeal. 
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17. We consider that the Administrative Court data on the total number of applications is a more 
complete reflection of the number of applications, but acknowledge that this may cause a 
slight margin of error due to the date that cases are reported. 
18. In making calculations for ‘success rates’ we decided to disregard data from 2020 due to 
the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the fact that a high proportion of cases granted 
permission in a Cart Judicial Review are yet to appeal in the Upper Tribunal’s data. This means 
that 2020 has insufficient data to make accurate calculations. 
19. The calculations also disregarded any cases which are pending a Upper Tribunal decision. The 
number of pending cases was removed from the number of total applications and number of 
appeals remitted to the Upper Tribunal. This means that our calculations are solely based on 
‘completed’ cases – ie that the Upper Tribunal has reached a judgment at an appeal hearing, or 
the Cart Judicial Review was withdrawn or dismissed at an earlier state.
20. We recognise there is no like-for-like comparison possible with other kinds of Judicial Review, 
but the academic consensus supports the approach of comparing a reasonable metric of 
‘success in a Cart Judicial Review’ with a reasonable metric of ‘success in a Judicial Review 
generally’. We believe a reasonable metric of success in a Cart Judicial Review is to have the 
appeal decision remitted back to the Upper Tribunal and for the Upper Tribunal to find the 
appeal in favour of the claimant when that appeal is heard. In other Judicial Reviews, academic 
studies tend to focus on the outcome of a substantive hearing and estimate the rate of 
settlement (for a specific topic or in general). The Independent Review of Administrative law 
examined evidence on the ‘success rates’ in Judicial Reviews finding there to be a general 
consensus of around 30-50% of claims being settled in favour of the claimant or found in their 
favour at a substantive hearing.38
Results
21. The tables below show the total number of cases in each year which reach each stage in 
the High Court and Upper Tribunal, in the course of a Cart Judicial Review and subsequent 
remittal to the Upper Tribunal. A number of cases are pending an appeal decision in the Upper 
Tribunal, this number for each year has been subtracted from the total number of applications 
to the High Court for a Judicial Review, the number granted permission, and the number 
given permission by the Upper Tribunal following remittal. This means that the calculation for 
success rate only count completed cases.
22. The first table shows the progress of Cart Judicial Reviews in the High Court (except those 
pending an appeal decision in the Upper Tribunal). In the relevant years, out of the total 
number of applications (1249) 89 were granted permission either at an oral or paper hearing 
while 2 were heard at a substantive hearing. This meant a total of 92 cases were remitted to 
the Upper Tribunal for a permission to appeal decision.
23. The second table shows the progress of cases which were remitted to the Upper Tribunal 
(again except those pending an appeal decision in the Upper Tribunal). This number is 85, 7 less 
than were remitted. As explained above this could be due to the timing of the applications for 
Judicial Review and when the Upper Tribunal is served with the case. Cases may also fall away 
38  Faulks et al, IRAL Report (CP 407), 176-177
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or be withdrawn for other reasons. The Upper Tribunal may also decline to give permission at 
the remitted permission to appeal stage.
24. Of the 85 cases granted permission following a remittal, the table records how many were 
found in favour of the claimant at the appeal hearing, and how many were found against. The 
number of pending cases is also recorded.
25. 42 cases were found in favour of the claimant at their appeal hearing, taking this number 
divided by the number of total applications for Cart Judicial Reviews (1249), produces the
‘success rate’ for Cart Judicial Reviews (3.4%).
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2012 161 2 3.73% 4 157 1
2013 672 34 5.21% 1 671 2
2014 776 55 7.99% 7 768 2
2015 1159 44 4.40% 7 1151 3
2016 683 27 4.83% 6 676 1
2017 789 52 6.97% 3 786 1
2018 614 42 7.17% 2 614 2
2019 635 38 7.09% 7 638 0
2020 307 24 8.79% 3 307 0
TOTAL 5796 318 6.18% 40 5768 12
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2012 – – – – – – –
2013 – – – – – – –
2014 – – – – – – –
2015 – – – – – – –
2016 – – – – – – –
2017 – – – – – – –
2018 45 7.33% 23 3.75% 22 3.58% 3
2019 40 6.30% 19 2.99% 21 3.31% 10
2020 4 1.30% 1 0.33% 3 0.98% 4
TOTAL - - - - - - -
2018-
2019
85 6.81% 42 3.36% 43 3.44% 13
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